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The Rwandese conflict c reated one o f  the  largest and fastest exoduses 
of refugees in modern history as one to 1.2 million People are estimated to have 
fled Rwanda and crossed into the Kivu region of Zaire (Goma and Bukavu) in four 
days. The dramatic effect and experience of this large concentration of refugees in 
Zaire have been quite challenging for the UN agencies and NGOs who responded 
Promptly; and traumatic for the host country population and, of course, far the 
multitude of the Rwandese refugees themselves. 
 
Largely overcrowded and chaotic. camp condition; continue to he 
exceptionally difficult for the refugee population while adversely  affecting the host 
Population by exacerbating the economic, socio-political and environmental 
degradation of the Kivu region. 
 
Even though hostilities in Rwanda are believed to have now ebbed. voluntary 
repatriation continues to he very slow because of fear on the  par t  of the refugees 
to return home to unknown circumstances; and principally due to the absence of 
security within the camps and the intimidation of refugees advocating or wishing to 
return to Rwanda by militant elements within the camps. The result is that a paltry 
250,000 refugees have reportedly returned by September, while the overall 
situation continues to deteriorate 
 
The United Nations Secretary-General, sharing the preoccupation of the 
Zairian Government authorities shout this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
dispatched his Special Representative of UNAMIR. Ambassador shaharyar Khan, 
to hold discussions with top Zairian Government officials on 12, 13, and 14 
September 1994. 
 
While generally agreeing that the voluntary and spontaneous repatriation of 
refugees in peace and dignity represented the best solution. Ambassador Khan 
and the Zairian authorities agreed, inter alia, on the deed for additional refugee 
camps in Zaire st an appropriate distance from the border to accommodate ex-army 
units and political leaders (and their families). The cost of opening these new 
camps and the logistical support for the transfer and running costs would be borne 
by the United Nations. 
 
It was further agree that a Joint Commission he formed by the United Nations 
on the one hand and the Zairian Government on the other in order to assess the 
logistical framework of the operation, the location of the sites, the capital and 
running costs of the camps and the security requirements of the exercise. 
 
This Joint Commission, comprising seven United Nations staff members 
(UNAMIR - five, UNHCR - one and UNDP - one) and 10 Zairian Government 
officials, and commenced 
Ix Lt Col Kayumbi, Logistics Corps ZAR; 
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x. Capt Kabamba wa Kasanda. representative for the Field Engineer corps ZAF. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE  
 
The Commission's terms of reference are as follows: 
 
a. To visit the refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaire; 
b. To visit new camp sites identified by the Zairian Government 
c. To explore how best to identify and separate the various categories of 
refugees, i.e. Military element, political leaders, militia - to include 
Interahamwe - and ordinary Rwandese refugees 
d. To relocate the political leaders and military personnel with their families; 





The Commission visited the provinces of North and South Kivu and held 
discussions with the different partners involved in handling the refugee crisis, 
notably the local authorities, UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations. Through 
these discussions it was able to obtain a clear picture of the refugee situation within 
the camps and of the different categories of refuges whose relocation or repatriation 
is being envisage It also met with three of the main categories, the refugee 
population in the camps the political leaders, and the military hierarchy. For 
practical reasons, it was not possible to meet with one of the key components of 
refugees, namely the militant youth groups. Nonetheless, information on the latter 
was obtained from those officials on the spot who are in daily contact with the 
refugees. The Commission then visited the relocation sites proposed by the Zairian 
Government set order to assess the logistical, operational / security, humanitarian, 
socio-political, and financial implications of this exercise, as well as to envisage a 
realistic plan for its eventual implementation. 
 
The present report provides a synthesis of then findings, conclusions and 
recommendations of the Commission. It attempts to idcutify the categories add 
numbers of refugees involved, assesses the possible reasons for the present stall 
in the voluntary repatriation that had reached its peak in August 1994, examines the 
relevant issues concerning the separation, relocation or repatriation of the various 
categories, and makes recommendations concerning the implementation of this 
exercice, as well as other relevant matters. It comprises a number of annexes 
which deal with specific aspects of the report, including an appraisal of the 
proposed relocation sites. 
 




Although insecurity in the camps is of different kinds, ranging From 
ordinary banditry and extortion to gang wars between rival groups fighting for control 
of the camps the most crucial security threat both for the refugees and for the local 
population is posed by the militant activities of militiamen, otherwise known as 
Interahamwe. This category of refugees on whore most of the mass killings in 
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Rwanda in April and May 1994 have been blamed, is the most complex and difficult 
to physically identify. Unlike soldiers, they neither wear uniforms nor carry any 
outward signs or symbols that can distinguish them from the rest of the civilian 
refugee population. They are reported to be in possession of firearms and grenades, 
and are equipped with vehicles and radio communication equipment which enable 
them to listen in on UNHCR security communications They have also set up an 
effective co-ordination structure within the cramps similar to the one they had during 
the mass killings in Rwanda in April and May 1994. 
 
On the day the commission arrived, fighting between the Interahamwe 
militiamen and a security group set up by the former Rwandese scouts Association 
(with UNHCR help), left at least two people dead and about five wounded. On the 
following day, this group took over the entire camp, sealing it off temporarily- 
Eyewitness reports from the camps talked of some 150 men patrolling the camps in 
search of two CARE workers. 
 
Although the lnterahamwe are known to be present in all civilian camps in 
North and South Kivu, they are much more active in North Kivu, where they are 
known to control all access into and out of the camps, and to consider the more 
moderate scouts association as well as any other group that either encourage.,; or is 
indifferent to voluntary repatriation as pro-RPF. According to some members of the 
former Government, one reason for the massive presence of these militiamen in 
Goma was the fact that Coma was nearer to Gisenyi and Ruhengeri than Bukavu, 
and these two towns had been the Strongholds of the late President's MRND party, 
of which Interahamwe was the youth wing. Also, since the former Government left 
through the Goma area and were protected by the Interahamwe, they followed them. 
The militiamen have succeeded in creating an atmosphere of terror in the camps, 
making it virtually impossible for the refugees, NGOs and UN agencies to even raise 
any issues relating to repatriation, relocation, or the separation of the militia from the 
rest of the refugees. 
 
No one seems to know exactly how many of those militiamen are in the camp. 
UNHCR has estimated that in Mugunga camp in North Kivu about 84 per cent of the 
youth belong to Interahamwe During one of the meetings with the Rwandese former 
Minister of Information, he revised the UNHCR estimate downward to about 60 per 
cent. In spite of the wide variation between these figures, they indicate one thing. 
namely, that the Interahamwe boast a significant presence in all camps in the Goma 
area, and that their influence is fast spreading to Bukavu where several incidents of 
violence and intimidation have been reported by both UNHCR and its operational 
partners. 
 
5.2 The political leaders 
 
The: Mission also found it difficult to obtain Accurate figures on the numbers 
of former Rwandese leaders such as ministers, senior government and military 
officials, members of parliament and other political personalities The official 
position of the Zairian provincial authorities was that, ever since the dignitaries had 
been advised to leave, they had stopped all contacts with the Zairian authorities, 
thus making it impossible for the Government to know how many of this category of 
refugees still resided )n the North and south Kivu provinces. Since news of the 
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politicians envisaged relocation had preceded the arrival of the Commission, the 
dignitaries with whom the Commission met were rather reluctant to provide such 
information. In the end, however, it was possible to obtain from the military and 
political hierarchy in Bukavu the following figures on the political leaders presently 
sheltering in Zaire  1 former Head of State, 21 former ministers, 54 members of 
parliament, 9 Senior Division Officers, 126 Mayors, and 18 officials of political 
parties. These figures add up to a total number of 228 political leaders to be moved. 
From this figure, the Commission estimates that in case of relocation, an 
appropriate working figure, including dependants would be around 1,200. 
 
In spite of the official position of the provincial authorities, the Commission 
learnt from the dignitaries themselves that they continue to be in constant contact 
with the authorities. 
 
5.3 The army 
 
The situation of this category of refugees is equally unclear, be It in terms of 
physical identification, location, numbers or status. It is true that many of the 
soldiers still wear uniform. However, the military commanders with whom the 
Commission met all confirmed that they were actively encouraging the soldiers to 
seek their own means of survival. One outcome of this recommendation from the 
military hierarchy has been soldiers swapping their uniforms for civilian clothes and 
mingling with the civilian refugees in the latter's camps in all the camps visited by 
the Commission there were visible signs of the presence of the military. At Inera 
camp for instance, where the refugee leaders and CARITAS denied the presence 
of any soldiers of the former army, a Zairian army captain on the Commission 
recognized a Rwandese army officer in civilian clothes with whom he had studied in 
the Royal Military Academy in Belgium This means that a number of the soldiers 
have merged with the civilian population, making the identification of the military 
difficult. 
 
In terms of the physical location of the soldiers, the situation in North Kivu is 
different from that in South Kivu. In North Kivu. there is no separate camp reserved 
exclusively for the military. Mugunga camp, located at 10 km outside Goma had 
been initially intended for the military, but once opened, was occupied by civilian 
refugees and is now occupied indistinctly by both soldiers and civilians. In South Kivu 
on the other hand, the physical location of the soldiers is more organized There are 
two military camps, one in Pansi, just outside Bukavu town, and the other in 
Bulooge further away. Pansi camp figures provided to the commission upon request 
uses mostly married soldiers and their families, as well as the sick and handicapped, 
while Bulonge is reserved for the able-bodied And single soldiers 
 
The figures obtained from UNHCR and the Rwandese military hierarchy do 
not seem to add up._ While UNHCR puts the number of soldier in North Kivu at 
between 22,000 and 25,000 the former RGF Chief of Staff based in Goma. General 
Augustin Bizimungu, estimates that there are 11,000 soldiers and some 4,460 
dependants based in Goma- 1n Bukavu the most senior officer in Pansi camp, 
Colonel Théonase Nyilimanzu, put the total number of soldiers in South Kivu at 
10,000, of whom 4,000 were at Pansi and 6,000 at Bulonge. He estimated the 
number of dependants at 6,000. This would make a total of 16,000 for South Kivu, 
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including dependants. Colonel Nyilimanzu also indicated that the former Forces 
Armées Rwandese (FAR) had a total of 30;000 men before the latest civil war. At a 
final meeting with the former PAR Deputy Chic[ of Staff and Head of Operations, 
General Gratien Kabirigi, yet other figures came up suggesting a total force of 31,000 
of whom 20,000 are based in North Kivu, and 11,000 t. South Kivu. To this figure 
would be added sonic: 19,000 dependants. Based on all these figures and on 
information gathered informally, the Commission estimates that a realistic figure of 
RGF soldiers and their dependants present in Zaire could be put at 50,000. This 
figure includes two Generals and 86 other senior officers. In the event of relocation, 
however, a realistic working figure would have to take account of desertions, 
resistance to relocation, those that have already jointed the RPA, and those who 
might be encouraged to move elsewhere to avoid being transferred. This could 
leave about 30,000 people to be moved, including dependants. This is the figure 
that the Commission used for planning purposes. 
 
It should he pointed out that during the mission, no official information was 
obtained from the Zairian authorities with regard to the former Rwandese 
presidential guard. For their part, the RGF official in Bukavu estimated the number 
of soldiers in this category at one battalion (about 800 men). bases in Goma and 
Bukavu. They further denied information gathered informally in Goma and Bukavu 
that this category of soldiers sure camped together at a location around Goma, with 
their weaponry intact. If this information were confirmed, it would seem to indicate 
that this category of soldiers is being treated specially and constitutes it high degree 
of danger officially, however, the Zairian authorities have declared that all 
Rwandese troops who sought refuge in Zaire in July 1994 have been disarmed, 
although they do not rule out the possibility that, given the chaos that characterized 
the arrival of the troops, the disarming exercise might not have been effective. This is 
borne out by the number of violent incidents reported in the camps involving 
firearms. It is also corroborated by UNHCR reports of continued n military activity 
along the border involving some 325 Rwandese soldiers in Kanaganino and some 
600 ice Kamanyola. A Rwandese colonel has been constantly seen moving 
between Kamanyola Luvingi and Kanganino, and movement of RGF officers 
between Mugunga in North Kivu and Bukavu has recently increased In spite of this 
activity. UNHCR and NGOs assisting refugees in the camps believe that the military 
have not so far constituted as much of a significant factor of insecurity in the Imps 
as have the Interahamwe The true situation. however, remains unclear. 
' 
Figures provided on request by General Gratien Kabirigi to the Head of the 
UN delegation on the Commission. 
 
The international status of the soldiers has remained confused since their 
arrival in Zaire. Following UNHCR criteria for classifying refugees, they are not 
considered as refugees. because they are soldiers in uniform. On the other hand, 
they do nut fall under ICRC's mandate, because they are no longer in a situation of 
war, and are consequently not in need of protection from immediate danger. The 
result has been that, apart from the link support provide by CARITAS and CARE in 
Pansi camp, the military have not been receiving any relief assistance, except for 
those that have mingled with the civilian refugee-population. Discussions within the 
Commission led it to conclude that the closest the international community could 
come towards resolving the status issue would be to adopt Prddfaù do Mulinen's, 
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proposal of what could pertain in such instances and assimilate the soldiers as 
prisoners of war (since they remain soldiers according to the Zairian military code), 
thus bringing them under the mandate of the ICRC. The ICRC Chief of Sub-
delegation in Bukavu confirmed. this possibility to the Commission, further adding 
that it would he entirely up to the Zairian Government to confirm the prisoner-of-war 
status of these soldiers before ICRC intervention could he envisaged. 
 
5..4 The civilian refugee population 
 
This category of refugees constitutes the bulk of the total Rwandese refugee 
population. They are currently sheltered in camps run by UNHCR and other 
operational partners in North and South Kivu. UNHCR presently estimates that 
there are 850,000 refugees in North Kivu, in the Mugunga, Kibumba and Katale 
areas, and 336,736 in South Kivu, of whom 281,912 are spread over 28 sites 
around Bukavu and around 54,824 In 18 camps is and around Uvira. Although life 
in these camps has greatly improved in comparison with the situation in July and 
August 1994, living conditions are still extremely difficult, 'with refugees having to 
make do with about one third of what is considered as the normal daily caloric 
requirement. 
 
Life in the camps is presently relatively well organized. Leaders have been 
selected and other structures created, often with UNHCR support, to facilitate the 
distribution of supplies end ensure security. Although the leaders selected by the 
refugees are different from the former political leaders, the latter continue to 
influence opinion ia the camps. The camp leaders believe that their fate is tied to 
that of the political leaders and the military, and consult with them on a regular 
basis on all important matters including voluntary repatriation. Opinion in the camps 
is, however, greatly influenced by the Interahamwe, using physical threats and even 
murder to impose its views. 
 
6. REASONS FOR THE PRESENT STALL IN REPATRIATION 
 
From its discussion with representatives of the different categories of the 
refugees, the provincial authorities. UN agencies and humanitarian organizations, 
the Commission WAS able to discern three phases in the movement of the refugee 
population since July. First. there was the massive influx in mid-July 1994 brought 
about by a real or perceived fear of revenge killings by the RPF. Then came the 
expressed well of the refugees to return. and the actual return of an estimated 
200,000 refugees confined by UNHCR in August and the beginning of September. 
This second phase was visibly characterized on the one hand by the militant activity 
of militiamen and the political leaders opposed to voluntary repatriation and, cm the 
other hand, by the readiness of UNHCR to promote and assist voluntary 
repatriation third phase, which is actually the present phase, is characterized by a 
drastic cut-back in the number of voluntary returnees. Through its discussions in 
and outside the camps, the Commission was able to establish the following main 




During the meetings, it became clear to the Commission members That the 
main factor that negatively affected repatriation was fear on the part of the refugees 
of RPA reprisals against the background of reported atrocities and massacres of 
Tutsis and moderates Hutus during the war. Reference was also made to the 
alleged killing of Hutus in the past, including the massacres in 1472 of over 300,000 
Hutus by Tutsi in Burundi 
 
6.2 The historical factor 
 
Repeatedly, refugees in the various camps and the former dignitaries 
informed the commission that the root cause of the Rwandese problem lies in what 
they call 'four hundred years of Tutsi oppression of the Hutu majority Population 
stating that this historical perspective makes them dread the emergence of yet 
another period of Tutsi hegemony. Even though the: Commission explained that the 
new ' Broad-based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) of Rwanda comprises 
both Hutu and Tutsi leaders they did not appear to support that view, as they 
maintained that the real power in the present arrangement was in the hands of the 
Tutsis. 
 
6.3 UNHCR reports of systematic killings 
 
The Commission noted the readiness of the political leaders and those 
representing the refugees in the camps to believe UNHCR reports of systematic 
killings by the Rwandese Government, while admitting that they did not have 
concrete proof to corroborate such reports, and to dismiss UNAMIR's appraisal of 
the situation which had questioned such reports on the grounds of insufficient proof 
In all the camps visited, and during all discussions held with Rwandese refugee 
leaders. UNHCR reports were Cited as sufficient reason to rule out any 
encouragement by these leaders of voluntary repatriation of the refugees. While the 
Commission was not in a position to determine quite clearly the extent to which the 
UNHCR reports had actually contributed in curbing voluntary repatriation among the 
ordinary refugees, it did, however, establish that the said reports had strengthened 
the hand of those leaders who had already been opposed to voluntary repatriation 
and who influence opinion in the camps. It must be stated that the second UNHCR 
representative showed a remarkable interest and co-operation during the visits and 
the preparation of the final report Upon request by the Commission, however, the 
ex-politicians in Bukavu presented a list of Rwandese persons that have been 
reportedly killed by the RPA in Rwanda, ;sad asked that this matter he taken up with 
the present authorities in Rwanda. 
 
6.4 Eyewitness reports of systematic killings 
 
Refugees who had opted for voluntary repatriation arc known to have 
returned to tell the stories of revenge killings by the RPA Although the commission 
cannot confirm the systematic authentication of these accounts by neutral sources, 
some of the witnesses quoted would seem to have no reason to blow any of such 
stories out of proportion. The Vice-Governor of South Kivu, for instance, told the 
story of four Catholic Sisters, two Hutu and two Tutsi, who had left for Rwanda a 
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couple of weeks before the arrival of the Commission, and of whom Only the two 
Tutsis had returned to Bukavu. only to report on the disappearance of their Hutu 
companions. This and other accounts had greatly contributed towards the stall in 
voluntary repatriation. 
i 
6.5 Lack of confidence in the new Rwandese Government 
 
The departure of the French forces from Rwanda and the refugees lack of 
confidence in UNAMIR and the Rwandese Government have also enraged as 
some of the reasons contributing towards the present stall in the voluntary 
repatriation process, Even in South Kivu where the Interahamwe are not very active 
ordinary refugees are known to express distrust of the new Government, 
demanding either that security be guaranteed by a neutral body, or that their own 
leaders be seen to participate m the new Government as a prerequisite to their 
return. 
 
The refugee reluctance to return to their homes is exacerbated by the 
present lack of certainty of property rights. On the one hand the pre" government 
has expressed the desire that refugees return to their homes yet the latter have no 
confidence in the government to guarantee them ownership of the properties that 
they left. If the present government is truly anxious to see the refugees return, then 
this matter should be given serious and prompt attention. The situation is further 
complicated by the government having already given some deserted properties to 
members of the victorious army. Few refugees could be expected to be willing to 
confront armed military personnel jiving in their former homes. 
 
6.6 Rote of the political leaders 
 
Throughout its discussions with the refugee leadership at the camps as well 
as with the military and political leaders, the Commission noted a conscious attempt 
nrr the part of its interlocutors to deny any deliberate effort on their part to influence 
the attitudes of the refugees towards repatriation. At Mugunga camp, the camp 
Prefects denied having had any contacts with the political leaders over the two 
previous months, while at Katale, the camp leaders described their role in purely 
social and humanitarian terms. For their part, the politicians informed the 
Commission during discussions held at Bukavu of the difficulties they encountered 
as a result of the Zairian Government's hen on political activity by the refugees. 
 
In spite of the above, claims, the Commission was able to establish through 
both format and informal contacts that members of the former Rwandese 
Government were in constant contact with the refugee leaders in the camps who, in 
turn, appeared to be ineffective control of public: opinion among the refugees. One 
of the possible consequences mentioned by the political leaders themselves) of 
their transfer out of Goma would be the possibility of easily convincing the refugee 
Population to return to Rwanda under risky conditions. Furthermore, the leaders 
continually referred to the fact that the presence of the majority of the Rwandese 
population outside the country was ample proof of the credibility and legitimacy of 
the leadership-in-exile, thus implying an interest in keeping the refugee population 
in neighbouring countries as a bargaining counter. It is worth noting that while the 
camp leaders consistently referred to refugee welfare problems in the camps, at no 
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point did the political and military leaders refer to the humanitarian predicament of the 
ordinary refugees in the camps as a key factor is considering a speedy resolution of 
the crisis. Those political and military leaders do not live in camps. They reportedly 
live in hotels in Goma and Bukavu under very good conditions. Desperation will 
develop what they run out of resources and that could develop some hidden 
Attitudes. 
 
The long history of horrific acts of brutality by both sides in the Rwandan 
conflict appears to have set in motion a dynamic of its own Fear of what the other might 
do has consistently driven each side to act preemptively to remove the threat they 
believe they face. Though not wishing in any way to apologize for or excuse the 
Hutu atrocities in the most recent crisis. the Tutsi massacre of several hundred 
thousand Hutus in 1972 in Burundi and their ruthlessness in the 1990 crisis go a 
long way to explain the current level of fear in the minds of the refugee population. 
The refugee's army has been defeated by the very enemy they have feared for 
centuries and they naturally feel vulnerable. Whether it is rational or not the fear is 
very real in their minds. Of course, hatred and fear arc close cousins when 
emotions are as strong as they are in Rwanda. This may help to understand the 
apparently unreasonable demands of leaders on both sides of the conflict. The 
international community ought to strive as its first priority in Rwanda, to help 
establish a balance of the vulnerability and fears present in the current situation. To 
this end, steps that increase the feelings of exposure by either side ought to be very 
carefully considered, as the very feeling of vulnerability will play into the hands of 
those with extreme solutions to their problems in mind. One should not forget the 
ease with which the Nazi regime manipulated fear of the Jews with such horrible 
results. One could understand the activities of the MRND in the same light. If this is 
understood, it follows that whether the former RGF is a credible. force in the minds 
of the RPA is immaterial if their proximity reduces the feelings of vulnerability in the 
minds of the refugees. 
 
6.7 Role of the military leaders 
 
The Commission was also able to establish the fact that the military 
hierarchy was working in a co-ordinated manner within the provinces of North and 
South Kivu. The insistence of the refugee leaders, particularly in the camps in North 
Kivu, to return to Rwanda only if their own army would be willing to return to protect 
them, and the established presence of both disarmed and armed military personnel 
in the camps, were further proof of the fact the RGF presence in North and South 
Kivu is of significant importance; to the refugee situation there. The role of the RGF 
leaders in opposing voluntary repatriation is very similar to that of the politicians. 
The presence of the top military officers at the meeting arranged by the commission 
to have discussions with the political leaders, and the presence of political leaders 
at the Commission's discussions with the military, are proof of the co-ordination that 
exists between these two categories of refugees of the common 80415 being 
pursued, and of the similarity of their influence: on the refugee population. 
 
6.8 RoIe of Interahamwe 
 
As mentioned earlier in this report militant youth groups, believed to be made 
up mostly of Interahamwe militiamen strictly regulate public o pinion among the 
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refugees, particularly in North Kivu, and are known to be to voluntary repatriation 
Familiar with the Interahamwe's violent methods, the Commission is convinced that 
the only way of enabling the refugee population to make its own judgement on the 
opportuneness of voluntary repatriation would be to separate the Interahamwe from 
the rest of the population. Nonetheless, the fact that the Interahamwe and other 
militant groups have to use force to control public opinion in this respect is proof of 
the fact that there is a trend, however insignificant, towards voluntary repatriation. 
This trend is borne out by a UNHCR report to the commission on cases of refugees 
voluntarily leaving the camps to settle closer ho the border with Rwanda as a 
possible prelude to voluntary repatriation. UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organization reports indicate that the militant actions of this group have constituted 
the single most effective factor in checking such voluntary repatriation initiatives. 
 
6. 9 Public pronouncements of the Rwandese Government 
 
It was clear from listening to the different categories of refugees that the 
Commission was able to meet that some public declarations of the new Rwandese 
Government have not helped to mobilize opinion in the camps in favour of voluntary 
repatriation Many political tenders cited remarks made by government officials 
during the victory celebration gated by the Kigali Government, and which did not 
seem to have figured well for a speedy resumption of dialogue between the rival 
parties Some of these declarations are being used by those opposed to voluntary 
repatriation to buttress their arguments. The refugees expressed the desire to 
communicate with the Kigali Government. 
 
6.10  Role of the Zairian Government 
 
it was obvious in the Commission's discussions with the political and military 
loaders that in spite of sonic of the restrictive measures taken against them by the 
Zairian Government, they ate fully confident of either Zaire's support, or, at the very 
least. Its sympathy, far whatever goals they nriay be seeking to achieve is Rwanda. 
The military leaders spoke with confidence, sometimes making thinly veiled threats 
against the new Rwandese Government. The Commission feels that with this 
attitude it is unlikely that the political find military leadership would be able to fully 
measure the urgency of the refugee situation, especially its it relates to the sacrifices 
imposed on the local Zairian population by the continued presence of the refugees. 
 
As an example, the Kigali Government announced their intention to try 
30,000 persones aid to have participated in the genocides. Also, the five years 
transitional period allowed itself by BBGNU before democratic elections is 
considered raw long. 
 
7.  KEY ISSUES AFFECTING SEPARATION, RELOCATION AND 
REPATRIATION 
 
In light of the above analysis of the causes for the slow-clown ill the voluntary 
repatriation process and based on its belief that any eventual separation, relocation 
and / or repatriation of the refugees would have to be linked to tire prospects for an 
overall settlement of not only the refugee crisis but also the Rwandese crisis as a 
whole, the Commission examined some preliminary issues that would he crucial in 
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deciding on any of these three, or any other additional, options. These issues 
include i) assumptions on which the decision to separate or relocate was based; ii) 
the attitudes of the different parties in the present crisis with regard to, the options 
being referred to iii) political implications; iv) humanitarian implications; r) logistical 
implications; vi) security and operational implications; and (oil) financial  
implications. 
 
7.1  Assumptions 
 
The decision to separate the militant youth groups from the rest of the refugee 
population and to relocate the political leaders and the military further inland is 
predicated OIL a number of assumptions, among which is the fact that this will lead, 
sooner or later, to the voluntary repatriation of the vast majority. of the refugees. 
While this is possible in principle, it should be pointed out that a number of 
imponderables remain. Firstly, the effective separation of the Interahamwe from the 
rest of the population will be fraught with difficulties such as the effective 
identification of the members of these groups, and the quarantees that there will be 
efficient policing to ensure that infiltrations will not occur afterwards. Without these 
positive identification and policing quarantees the separation of the militant groups 
from the population cannot be effective. It must be emphasized that no ordinary 
refugee will be willing to point out Interahamwe. 
 
Secondly, for the relocation of the political Ieaders to serve as an effective 
deterrent to the present manipulation of the population, it will also be necessary to 
identify and penetrate parallel communication networks that presently link the leaders 
to the camps. Furthermore, it needs to be proven (and the Commission was not in a 
position to do so) that the degree of control that the leaders presently have over the 
population is weak enough for the vast majority of the refugee population to readily 
designate or accept new leaders. 
 
Thirdly, and with regard to the relocation of the military the commission was 
able to establish that, while their presence in the Goma and Bukavu areas had an 
influence on the attitude of the refugee towards repatriation, this presence was not 
necessarily the most urgent influential factor in this regard. UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations actually confirmed that the most urgent danger came from 
Interahamwe. on the other hand, the soldiers that would easily be identified for 
relocation would be those; who are now settled in the Mugunga. Pansi and Bulonge 
camps, whereas those soldiers - armed or unarmed - who presently have a direct 
influence on the refugee population, are those who no longer wear uniforms, and who 
have successfully mingled with the civilian Population in virtually ail the camps. Not 
only will this latter category not be identified, they will actually be entitled to UNHCFI, 
assistance. fact light of the a hove. the Commission believes that the basic 
assumptions would have to he re-examined before final action is taken regarding 
separation of militant groups from die population and relocation of the politicians and 
the military. If this is not done the relocation exercise could end tip actually 
strengthening, inadvertently, the assertions of the political leaders that they have no 
band in the present stall in the voluntary repatriation process. It is however clear that, 
at best, these actions can only be undertaken in conjunction with other political 
initiatives aimed at reassuring the population from within Rwanda, and reaching 
agreement between the parties concerned on a negotiations agenda. 
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7.2 Attitudes toward separation, relocation and repatriation 
 
The importance of this factor lies in the fact that no matter which of the above 
actions is emphasized, it will be necessary as a first step, to ensure, and eventually 
enlist, the collaboration of the key partners involved, including the categories of 
refugees to be moved. 
 
The partners whose attitudes towards these various options will be crucial in 
implementing the decisions to be made are the refugees themselves, the political 
leaders, the military, the militant extremist groups, the Zairian authorities, the 
Rwandese Government and the host population at the selected relocation sites. 
Following are the views of each of these categories, except for the Rwandese 
Government, as they emerged during their discussions with the Commission. 
 
7,2.1 The  refugees population 
 
As stated earlier due to the tense situation in most of the camps visited by the 
Commission, it was not possible to obtain directly the view of the ordinary refugees 
with regard to any of these onions. Furthermore, the plan to separate the militiamen 
from the rest of the refugee population and to relocate political and military leaders, 
bad not been discussed with the population prior to the arrival of the Commission. As 
far as voluntary repatriation is concerned however, the estimated 200,000 voluntary 
returnees to date', and the continued trickle of returnees into Rwanda in spite of 
threats from the militants and an extremely effective dissuasion mechanism set up 
by the political leaders, are proof that there is a continued urge among the 
refugees to return. This view is confirmed by UNHCR red from Mugunga camp in 
North Kivu. and by reports from other camps in South Kivu of increased inquiries of 
late by the refugee population on the possibilities of UNHCR assisting voluntary 
repatriation . it is. however, impossible to determine with any accuracy the 
motivations that lie at the root of the voluntary repatriation urge, or the conditions 
under which the vast majority of the refugee population would agree to voluntary 
repatriation Contacts; with one national NG0 in Bukavu which is working closely with 
the refugees and ' UNHCR estimates as at end September. This figure: is based on 
an actual head count of 120.000 and estimates of unco-ordinated border crossings. 
 
IRED/Grands Lacs, led by Mr. Zihindula Ngombe Ya Mwami P.O. Box 2375. Bukavu 
with Rwandese NGOs indicated that in the camps in Bukavu, a significant 
percentage of the refugees is willing to return if some recognized Hutu leaders who 
are known not to have participated in the rent massacres return to Rwanda and invite 
them to do same. 
 
7.2.3  The politicians, military leaders, and Interahamwe  
 
Interahamwe the political leaders and the RGF military hierarchy in Zaire are 
implacably opposed to either their removal from the Goma and Bukavu area, the 
separation of the Interahamwe from the rest of the refugee population, the 
relocation of the military into more remote parts of the country, or the reaction of 
the refugee population prior to an overall settlement of the conflict. It is never 
premature at this stage for the Commission to determine exactly to what extent 
these groups would go to actually resist attempts to move them away from the 
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border area.This eventuality must however be seriously considered in any actual or 
contingency plans to be developed, so as to determine the human resources and 
the logistics required for the operation 
 
Although there were some slight variations in the views expressed by the 
FAR hierarchy in Goma and in Bukavu, a common Clement emerged from the 
Commission's discussions with the former Rwandese military authorities, namely, 
the strong urge and the intention to regain power in Kigali. They are therefore 
opposed to the kind of relocation that would Jeopardize this goal. In Bukavu, the 
Commission learnt from local military sources who are in permanent contact with 
the local RGF hierarchy that the tatter bad attempted to initiate dialogue with the 
Zairian authorities aimed at obtaining relocation to enable regrouping and retraining 
in view of continuing the war. The Commission also noticed the remarkable 
confidence of the RGF hierarchy, particularly in the Goma area, that they could 
count on the Zairian support to regain power in Rwanda. 
 
One important element worth noting with regard to the views of the military is 
the fact that throughout the Commission's visit, the only time someone among the 
refugees referred to the possibility of designating new leaders to negotiate with the 
RPF was in the military camp in Pansi. The Commission noted that this was the 
only camp visited where the Interahamwe was not wed could not be active, and 
where the politicians could not easily impose their will. This fact only served to 
strengthen the Commission's belief that the separation of the militiamen and the 
politicians from the rest of the population is imperative. provided it is mericulous 
and is implemented in conjunction with other political. initiatives. 
 
7.2.4 The Zairian authorities and the host population 
 
At the highest level of the State. and in accordance with the transitional 
constitution of the country which defines national security and issues of military 
importance as areas of shared responsibility between the Government and the 
Head of State, it can he considered that Accordingly to this NGO, the names of 
former Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye and former Foreign Minister Mr 
lames Gasana, now Ambassador of Rwanda to the USA, are being cited. the 
decision has been taken by the Zairian authorities to relocate the politicians and 
the military from the border towns. It has also been agreed to separate the 
militiamen and armed elements in the camps from the rest of the population This 
was echoed by the provincial authorities who also laid emphasis on the sacrifices 
being made by Zaire is a whole and by the population of North and South Kivu in 
particular, and on the willingness of the population In the selected sites to help in 
cushioning the effect of the refugee influx in the country by accepting the transfer of 
some of the refugees to their respective provinces. 
 
Following its visits to the proposed sites, the Commission was able to notice 
a reasonable level of tolerance on the part of the local population around the 
selected sites vis à-vis the refugees. - It can therefore be said that there is a 
reasonable chance the population would accept the arrival of Rwandese soldiers of 
the RGF without much trouble. However, it should be noted that the argument used 
at every location to convince the local population was that the international 
community (i.e. the United Nations) would rehabilitate abandoned and sometimes 
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decaying infrastructure at the sites tot the refugees, from which the local population 
would benefit both during and after the relocation exercise This of course implies 
that the failure to rehabilitate such infrastructure before or during the relocation 
could result in the hostility of the host population in the medium term. The degree 
of this conviction on the part of the local population can be fully appreciated by the 
fact that some sections of the local population that had been initially hostile to the 
idea of hosting Rwandese refugees prior to the arrival of the Commission west 
actually pleading with members of the Commission later on to select their location 
as one of those to receive refugees. 
 
One noteworthy option put forth by the Vice-Governor of North Kivu of 
what should he done in case no immediate solution for relocation or repatriation 
could be found, was the setting up of s buffer zone within Rwanda under 
international control, where the refugees could be temporarily repatriated while 
awaiting a longer-term solution. Although members of the former Government 
seemed to rule out this possibility, the former RGF Head of Operations, General 
Gratien Kabirigi, clearly stated that the senior officers would prefer such a solution 
to being relocated further inside Zaire. However, the RPA having now been fully 
introduced in the south west of Rwanda, it will be extremely difficult to create such 
a buffer zone 
 
7.2.5  The United Nations 
 
Considering the terms of reference of the mission such as agreed during the 
visit to Zaire of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Rwanda, Ambassador 
Khan, it is clear that the United Nations was part of the decision to encourage 
voluntary repatriation by undertaking the relocation of political and Military leaders 
from the Zairian border and the separation of Interahamwe and other militant groups 
from the rest of the population Nonetheless, issues of funding, agency responsibility 
and inter-agency harmonization are yet ' to Kongolo (north-east Shaba province), 
the Commission was greeted on arrival with protests by political movements in the 
Division to be addressed, particularly between the United Nations Assistance Mission is 
Rwanda. (UNAMIR) and UNHCR Apart from disagreeing on the present security 
situation within Rwanda, it emerged from the commission discussions with UNHCR 
officials in Goma that, instead of relocation, UNHCR favours an approach that would 
Seek to slowly undermine the credibility of the political leaders and the militant groups in 
the camps by creating an alternative leadership structure. 
 
7.3 Political implications 
 
The political implications of the separation, relocation and repatriation exercise are 
varied. The most important, however arc the implications-that the exercise will have on 
the prospects; for a durable solution of the Rwandese problem. One accusation that 
kept recuring during the Commission's meetings with the different categories of refugees 
was am the international community had not fully understood the rest political problem in 
Rwanda. They stressed the fact that it had taken 400 years of ethnic domination to 
bring the country to its present predicament, and that to focus on the return of the 
refugees and ignore the more fundamental problem that divided the Hutus and Tutsi in 
Rwanda would be to treat the symptoms and ignore the dise.  
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As the Commission found out, the level of anti-T Tutsi feeling axing reynestatatives 
of the refugees in the Goma and Bukavu area is such that at no point during its 
discussions with these leaders was there a feeling of remorse for the recent 
genocidal acts in the country. This seems to imply that even among many people 
who might not have participated in the genocide, this feeling is equally strong, and will 
not necessarily go away even if the separation and relocation exercise was perfectly 
implemented and voluntary repatriation took place. 
 
7.3.1  Political conditions for repatriation 
 
Since the main concern of the international community is to ensure that the 
refugees get back home voluntarily, their presence in or departure front Zaire has 
now become the main subject of envisaged negotiations. In this light the 
Commission sought and obtained from the political and military leaders a number of 
conditions which if met, should, in principle, enable the refugees to return home. 
Their conditions can he summarized as follows. 
 
a. Negotiations with the new Government; 
b. Revival of acceptable elements of the Arusha Accords;  
c. Power sharing; 
d. Security guarantees; 
e. Involvement of the exiled leadership in all negotiation process 
f. setting up of an international tribunal that will also deal with alleged 
massacres committed by RPP forcc1. since 1990; 
g. The organization of early elections (and not after five years, as presently envisaged 
by the new Government); 
h involvement of the United Nations in a form that is different from UNAMIR as it is 
presently structured, to facilitate negotiations between the new Government and 
the leadership-in-exile, and to provide security quarantees for the safe return of all 
refugees, 
h. Guarantees of re-possession by the refugees of their property presently taken over 
by either the Government or other individuals. 
 
While it has been clear to the Commission that the political Ieaders see using the 
absence of the majority of the Rwandese population from the country as  bargaining 
counter, it is equally reasonable to believe that if all the refugees could voluntarily 
return today, the new Government would have even less reason to negotiate. Since the 
emphasis on most of these conditions is on negotiation. the present focus on the separation 
of different groups of refugees and the relocation of others could be seen to confirm the 
persistent accusations of the political leaders that the UN is leaning towards the new 
Government in Kigali. 
 
7-3.2  Political implications for Zaire 
 
In spite of the overall feeling of tolerance that the Commission was able to discern 
from its limited contacts with the host populations concerned, it also received letters of 
protest from human rights, political and other civil society pressure groups which will 
certainly turn the exercise into a political issue, something that will not necessarily be easy 
for the Government to manage in an election year. 
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It will also be required that Zaire show proof of political will to carry through the 
envisaged operations once they are designed and agreed upon. Given the present state of 
relations between the local authorities in the Goma and Bukavu areas, it will be necessary 
that written accords be signed and respected between all pubes concerned, particularly with 
regard to policing the movement of certain categories of refugees to he relocated. 
 
7.3.3  Political implications for the United Nations 
 
Throughout its contacts with representatives of the refugees, the Commission 
noticed a deep level of distrust via-à-via the United Nations, particularly UNAMIR and its 
Canadian Commander at the time of the civil war, General Dallaire. It also registered their 
hope that a different LIN structure,or a restructured UNAMIR, would handle the 
security guarantees and the political negotiation component of the operation. This would 
certainly imply the involvement: of the Security Council. 
 
On the other hand, the conditions and wishes of the representatives of the refugees 
would not necessarily be those of the new Government in Kigali. It would therefore also he 
the task of t he United Nations, speaking with one voice, to reconcile the differences that 
could stand in the way of a negotiation agenda. 
 
7.4 Humanitarian implications  
 
7.4.1  Security 
 
from observation during the Commas ion's visit to the various camps and the 
discussion with the refugees themselves it became clear that the refugees consider 
themselves to have moved to the safety of Zaire and are therefore secure against 
forced repatriation. The principle of non-forced repatriation as enshrined in Article 33 
of the 1951 Convention obliges states not to take any action to expel or return a refugee 
a place wheel his or her life or freedom would be unnecessarily threatened. And 
according to the 1951 Statute of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, this involves a respect for their basic human rights as refugees. It is 
therefore unacceptable  one 'refugees" should terrorize others and physically 
prevent the great majority of the common folk as it were from exercising their free will 
to repatriate or otherwise voluntarily. The establishment of appropriate security 
measures in the camps should he observed and not compromised. To this end, there 
is an urgent need for the deployment of the UN force to work alongside the security 
forces of the host country, Zaire It is necessary, therefore, that the logistical 
requirements of Zaire be considered to give the UN force an enhanced participatory 
role in effecting appropriate security arrangements within the camps in the Kivu 
regions. Of Equal importance is the indispensability of host country cooperation and 
support during and after the relocation of the ex-military and former government 
dignitaries to their new sites. This is necessary because there will he need for: 
 
a The ex-military and former dignitaries to move in relative safety and dignity 
{barring the force of law of the international tribunal 
b.. Security for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the displaced; 
d. Security for the overall operations, including all relief activities within and 
without the camp sites, even though there appears to be a strong law and order 
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presence by the Zairian Governors in all the camp sites that were visited / 
inspected by the Commission. 
 
7.4.2  Relief assistance 
 
Assistance in food and non-food items is essential to the category of refugees 
that will have to be relocated, in a manner similar to the distribution strategy of 
humanitarian assistance a, co-ordinated by UNHCR in the Goma/Bukavu region, 
since disturbances are often the result of refugees not receiving food. 
 
7.4.3  UNHCR 
 
It is noteworthy that UNHCR enjoys the confidence of the refugees As such 
UNHCR, operating through implementing partners, is heft suited to spearhead this 
operation from a humanitarian point of view in view of i) the UNHCR mandate, and 
ii) the hands-on experience of administering the Goma and Bukavu camps even 
under the most taxing of circumstances it is therefore anticipated that with the 
UNHCR factor, the "refugees" arc more likely to co-operate with I UNHCR than with 
any other UN aid agency. The deployment of a senior UN official to coordinate the 
matrix (if humanitarian activities would complement this endeavor. 
 
7.4.4  Strategic considerations 
 
it is noteworthy that the most attractive solution Outwards in enduring peace 
is voluntary repatriation for all refugees into Rwanda within the shortest possible 
time. Obviously, the present strategy is a medium-tam strategy at best 
Contemporaneously, there is an obvious need for negotiations to be conducted, 
hopefully by the now reconstituted UNAMIR, among all the parties involved in the 
Rwandese conflict, with a view to securing a more durable peace. 
 
Theme is also a problem, it would appear, in the area of housing which could 
have been exacerbated by the houses destroyed during the war: and further 
aggravated by the influx of some Rwandese in generations of exile. It is essential 
that the present Government in Rwanda secure reasonable assistance for the 
construction of human settlements, using perhaps appropriate technology schemes, 
to address the sore problem of illicit occupancy by come Rwandese of other 
people's houses, which is a sure deterrent to voluntary repatriation.  
 
7.5 Assessment of sites visited 
 
7.5.1  Introduction 
 
For the relocation of the erstwhile FAR currently living under difficult 
circumstances in North and South Kivu, the Government of Zaire proposed four 
sites, all of which are military installations. 
 
The entire Commission visited the military camps of Kongolo (Shaba Region) 
and Lokando Maniema For logistics reasons only, four out of the 14 members who 
went to Mbandaka visited the camp of Irebu (Equator Region). There was no 
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need to visit the military camp in Buta northern Zaire) for two main reasons that the 
Commission only discovered on arrival in the town of Buta: 
 
a. The camp was occupied by the local police, for whom no alternative 
accommodation could be found; 
b. That camp could only house 120 people 
All three sites visited arc rather far from North and South Kivu (from 700 km 
to 1,500 ken away). Access to two of the cites (Lukando and irebu for the 
near future would demand the use of river transport (very slow and 
potentially harzadous because of sand bars) 
 
It should be pointed out, through that Lokando would be accessible by 
band from Kindu airport if an existing 60 km road is repaired. The distance from 
North/ South Kivu to the Irebu / Mbandaka also needs to be emphasized. 
 
Government of Zaire officials have Suggested that all the military and their 
dependants that are to be transferred (estimated at 30,000 to 50,000) be 
distributed to as many MOMS as lxwssiblc to reduce the political impact. This will 
argue for our using all three available military camps proposed. 
 
We could, however, press for the use of tun instead of all three sires. 
Arrangements for policing /securing the camps, administering them, as well as 
medical /water/other common facilities would be more cost effective if we could use 
two sites. Lokando for the 10,000 to 12,000 in the South Kivu area and Irebu for the 
estimated up to 18,000 military end their dependants in the Goma area. 
 
As a negotiating position vas-â vas the Zairian authorities, we could argue 
that we have gone into two out-of the three potential regions that could hold the 
military group to repair/ revitalize those military installations. Furthermore, the local 
economy will receive an injection of external funds and other resources with the IN 
presence. Also, wherever possible, we could improve the local infrastructure with a 
relatively small outlay to the satisfaction of the local population (60 km road 
Kinds/Lokando to be repaired, airports at Kindu and Mbandaka already made of 
tarmac could be improved further if necessary; medical and potable water facilities 
for the ex-FAR and their families would be shared with the Zairians in the 
immediate environs of the camps). Finally, Zairian military personnel may have a 
role in the policing of the camps, alongside the UN military contingents. 
 




The military  camp is part of the town of Kongolo which has 60,000 
inhabitants This means that on landing at the air strip of the town the military to be 
transferred would need to travel fewer than three kilometres to reach the camp. The 
air strip Is. however. Of laterite and there is some uncertainty as to its capacity to 
receive large plants. Improvements would have to be made to the runway of the air 
strip before it could take aircraft capable of carrying up to 500 people at a time. 
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currently it takes about a week to reach Bukavu or Lubumbashi by road. The train 
comes to the town once every three months, ore to a shortage fuel This means that 
If fuel were made available, the train could reach the town more often. 
 
7.5-2-2 Current use of camps 
 
The camp is currently occupied by 170 Zairian military with their families 
 
7.5.2-3  State of the structured 
 
Kongolo camp probably has more buildings than the other two camps of 
Lokando and Irebu. Single rooms with covered verandah alone amount to 1,040. to 
addition, there are many other structures, kitchens, officers' houses, dispensaries, 
maternity, a large school block, offices, four dining halls and other structures. Originally, 
the camp was planned for a battalion Unfortunately, many of the roofing sheets have 
disappeared  about 40 Percent of the structures have no roofing sheets. 
 
The: camp is very spacious, and if selected there would be no difficulty in 
finding space to construct semi-permanent structures or to erect tents. , 
 
7.5.2.4  Infrastructure 
 
water The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. It would therefore be 
possible to pump the river water and treat it for human consumption. However, the 
local authorities stem to expect that the town's war system (for its 60,000 inhabitants) 
will be rehabilitated with the coming of the Rwandese military This will involve 
replacing much of the town's piping system, repairing the pumping machine (80 kW), 
and above all providing fuel and chemicals for running the system. 
 
Electricity Since the camp is in the town it would be difficult to provide the 
Rwandese with a generator for lighting when the townsfolk stay in darkness at night. 
'Me town had electricity once; to rehabilitate it would demand replacing most of the 
cables installed in the 1950 many stolen replacing the large generator which used to 
supply electricity to the town and, once again, providing, on a continuing basis, fuel to 
power the generator. We were informed that the 270 kW thermal plant the town had 
cannot be repaired, and that to provide adequate capacity the town net" a 500 kW 
capacity engine. 
 
Health There is a large medical facility in the town. Only part of the buildings 
are in use If i we could reserve UN support to the community to only one sector, we 
would recommend the full rehabilitation and provision of medical equipment and 
other resources to the medical centre so that it could be used by both the Rwandese 
and the local people instead of outing a separate medical facility exclusively for the 
occupants of the military camp. Incidentally,, the camp is less than half a kilometre 
from the town hospital. 
 
7.5.2.5  Conclusions 
 
Logistically, Kongolo is, in our view, the most daunting of the three potential 
sites. furthermore, as it was reported earlier. on our arrival there was an orderly 
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demonstration at the airport (with placards) against any relocation to the region. The 
population only concurred with the delegation where it was explained to them that there 
would be potential benefits with Rwandese arrival in their town. 
 
Despite all of the above, it should be noted that if it is decided to use this camp, it 
could host more than 15,000 without any difficulty. 
 
7.5.3 Irebu camp - Equator region  
 
7.5-3.1  Access 
 
Irebu can he reached entirely by the Zaire river. from Mbandaka over a 
distance of some 100 kilometres. That was the mode of transport the mission used on 
11 October. The level of the water was very high and there was therefore not much 
danger of sand bar's. We were informed that except for the peak of the day 
season (June to August), the river can be navigated all year round by large barges 
that carry up to 500 people. We Saw sonic of these large boats at the ports loading 
people and goods. (With a speed boat we did the journey in one and 314 hours.) 
 
The Colonel in charge of the camp also advised us that there was once an 
air strip (1000 metres by 60 mettres) but that it was now completely overgrown Any 
repair of the air strip would require heavy machinery to he brought in from 
Mbandaka or elsewhere by boat. 
 
7.5.3.2 Current use 
 
The camp was originally built by the Belgians in the 1.920s. Additional 
buildings were added to it up to the 1940s. It was closed in 1960 and reopened in 
1979. since its reopening it bas been used as a naval training centre Three hundred 
and seventy-five military personnel. (men and women) currently live in the camp. 
 
the buildings were generally in good condition, certainly the best maintained 
of the three camps we visited. Out of all the buildings, some 10 blocks (each divided 
into two) could be turned into dormitories to house up to 100 people each. In 
addition, there were some 54 two-room self-contained buildings meant for the more 




The Commission members estimated that up to 3,000 people could be 
house! is the existing buildings. Almost all the buildings had their roofs intact and 
were in reasonably good shape Even though we are in the rainy season we did not 
see any leaks in the buildings which were not in use The: larger blocks which are 
mostly not being used, would need to have windows, doors and mosquito netting 
installed before people could be males to live in them. In several of the buildings the 
cement floor has to he re-done. 
 
 
Naturally, to house more than 3,000 people additional structures (tents, 
semi-permanent buildings or other) would have to be erected The camp is very 
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spacious and could carry the anticipate 10,000 to 15,000 people without any 
difficulty. 
 
7.5.3.4 Other facilities 
 
The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river Since there is no large population 
group near the site there was no evidence of ft river water being polluted. The 
preferred mode of potable water supply should he the OXFAM method of pumping 
river water into large metallic containers, filtering / purifying the water, and then 
providing public standpipes. We were also advised that there was a spring some 
five kilometres from the camp. 
 
Health There is a functioning dispensary in the camp with three nurses. two 
of whom we met during our visit. The building in which they were operating could be 
used to set up a clinic:, to include admission facilities. Latrines would have to be built 
cooking facilities Kitchens would have to be built. 
 
7.3.3.5 General considerations  
 
The local population is said to be very small probably under 3,000. The nearest 
village is not within sight of the camp. The authorities at Mandaka were clearly 
enthusiastic about the military's coming (it is the President's home region). With the 
difficulty of access to the area there are no local population groups to put up any 
objection to their presence. 
 
The camp however, is in a very pleasant setting, and with the right frame of 
mind the military, if taken there. could engage in sporting and large scale agricultural 
activities. The initial transfer of the military would he by air up to Mbandaka good 
tarmac airport), to be followed by boat up to Irebu The airstrip in Irebu would, 
however, have to be repaired for the purposes of rapid access (medical evacuation, 
for instance) or urgent resupply drugs etc.). 
 




The Lokando military camp is 60 kilometres north of the town of Kindu, capital 
of the Maniema region. There is a dirt road from Kindu to Lokando 1t is, however, in 
a state of disrepair. There is no airstrip in the town nor in the camp; a helicopter 
could, however, land there,. The usual way to reach Lokando is by boat. The regional 
military personnel advised the mission that the waterway (Zaire river) is navigable by 
large boats, except at the peak of the dry season when sand bars pose a danger to 
navigation and only canoes can be used.. 
 
7.5.4.2 current use of camp 
 
The camp was built by the Belgium colonial power around 1936 for the training 
of local troops. That activity continued until 1963. From then until 1988, the 21st 
Infantry Battalion of independent Zaire occupied the camp. Subsequently, part of the 
Camp is being used by a Roman Catholic priest as a vocational training centre for 
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unemployed youth. Between the few trainees and local gendarmerie residing in the 
camp, only a small proportion of the buildings are occupied Given the wet, humid 
climate and dense forest vegetation is the area, the unused buildings are deteriorating 
very rapidly. 
 
The camp has 122 principal structures comprising 17 villas. 66 block s each 
capable of housing 30 people, and a total of 39 other buildings which originally 
served administrative, storage and other purposes.if the latter category of -
buildings is also used for accommodation, the existing camp structures can house 
some 3,000 people. 
 
But, as noted earlier, many of the buildings will need extensive repair of their 
walls and the fixing of windows and doors. 
 
Furthermore as with the two other camps visited, additional structures and tents 




sanitation Each block bass a detached six-room Turkish flush latrine system. 
mime there is no running water in the camp, the system does not work. A new 
sanitation system would have to be developed for the camp. 
 
The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river The rivet water can therefore be 
pumped, treated and distributed for human consumption. Electricity Tun is no 
electricity either in the camps or in the adjoining village. The village is rather 
small (fewer than 2,000 inhabitant) thus, although the camp is set at a distance from 
the village (about one kilometre away), it would be good to make electricity 
available to the village if some of the former Rwandese military are relocated to the 
Lokando 
 
Any health facility to be established in the camp would have to be extended to the 
local community.In preparation for the Commission's arrival in the region, the local 
authorities had made a technical assessment of the nature and cost of replies of the 
60 kilometre road. The works would appear to require only a few weeks and simple 
machinery 
 
G . Maniema region is very isolated, and road access from the capital Kindu to 
other regions is very poor. contributing to the general depression and high cost of 
living in the area. Probably because of the perception of the local authorities of 
potential economic benefits of the relocation to their region. the enthusiasm 
demonstrated try the local population at all levels during the Commission's visit was 
remarkable. 
 





The aim of this section is to develop a workable concept of operations for the 
removal of identifiable members of the forma RGF and political leaders of the 




Only sites agreed to by the Zairian authorities arc considered. The political 
ramifications will be considered separately, however it is understood that the military 




Time. In order to encourage the refugee population to return to their 
homes in time to get crops in the ground for the next rains, it was determined that 
the removal of the two target groups should he completed no later than the end of 
January 1995. Although the sites themselves can be prepared quickly, access to 
them is severely limited, and the flow into each of them will be slow because of the 
lack of transportation infrastructure. It is anticipated that approximately two months 
would be required to complete the move from D-Day. Unless this can be shortened 
movement will have to begin by the end of November to meet the deadline. 
 
Potential sites. The three sites chosen by the Zairian Government are difficult 
to get to and require significant improvements. In each case it would be necessary to 
each them by air and in Lokandu and Irebu there would be an additional requirement to 
travel part of the distance by river. Establishing facilities and maintaining them will 
require substantial investment in infrastructure and lead time. The actual 
requirements will be determined in the logistics assessment. 
 
RGF attitudes to resettlement Either the RGF will accept the idea of 
resettlement of they will not. If they will ant, it will be necessary to force them to 
move. In this ease, it will he necessary to put sufficient forces on the ground in the 
Kivu area in sufficient strength to forcibly disarm, collect, and escort the RGF to 
cantonment camps in this case, secrecy before the event would be essential to 
success, as early warning would permit former soldiers to melt away into the 
population or to arm themselves for resistance. Further, reluctant former army 
members will be difficult to recognize and to coerce onto whatever means of insport is 
chosen. Authority for this kind of operation would acquire permission to use levels of 
force far beyond those allowed by Chapter VII. Since it is unlikely that this would he 
allowed without considerable debate and since this debate would be very difficult to 
keep secret, the best hope would be to let the Zairian army conduct the initial part of 
the operation alone. 
 
 However, since their Prime Minister is ore record as requesting the 
international community to undertake this task, some other force will be required. As 
there arc approximately 30,000 soldiers and families spread about among various 
camps in the area, it is anticipated that a force of significant strength would be 
required in each of the North and South Kivu sectors to blanket the area and to 
minimize the possibility of resistance. Strict secrecy will be essential if resistance is 
anticipated. If the RGF accepts the idea of resettlement, that the UN could handle 
the voluntary disarming, collecting and moving of troops without problem. 
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Political leadership attitude to resettlement_ Either the political leaders will go 
along with the idea nr. they will not. If they do, then the UN Problem is reduced to the 
administrative task of transporting them with their families to sites agreed to by them 
and by the host nation. The Leadership is unlikely to agree to go anywhere that does 
not allow them good communications with their people and with the outside world 
Given that none of the sites proposed by Zairian authorities offer this, then it is likely 
that they will resist. 1n this case the best hope of ensuring co-operation lies in 
allowing whatever force is tasked to gather them up at the same times as the 
members of the former RGF are collected._ There are approximately 1,200 persons 
to be fathered .!s category if family members are included. Identifying And gathering 
these people together against their will would require a polico-type force of several 
hundred, since the operation. would have to be carried out suddenly and quickly. 
 
Refugee attitude to being separated from army and leadership. Either the 
refugees will go along with the idea of being separated from their leaders and their 
army or they will not. Given the level of fear induced by the recent Tutsi military 
success and the long history of oppression that they believe they have suffered, they 
are highly unlikely to accept the departure of their perceived protectors and leaders 
without resistance. If they resist, it may he necessary to use force to extract members 
of either or both categories of persons discussed here. This would require a large 
number of troops in a complex operation and would be likely to attract attention of 
'.he world press and the censure of liberal governments. Again, the best hope of 
sues would lie in quick :: and decisive action It should he noted that any direct 
involvement by the UN in this operation would certalm.. cad to aggravation of the 
already cynical attitude expressed towards them by Rwandan Hutus. if the move is 
unpopular and the UN is blamed for it, then there will be scant hope of UN 
involvement in negotiating the return of the remaining refugees to their homes. In 
fact, if word gets out that the UN is even considering forcing the issue in this way, it 
could lead to open hostility. Given the sense of vulnerability among the refugee 
population and the presence of rabid militias in the camps, the security problems that 
this operation is aimed at would be very probably exacerbated by rumours of this 
plan. The presence of a strong security force in the camps to protect UN agencies 
and NGOs will be essential both before and after the operation. If the above 
reasoning is correct, a UN force would not he the be. for the job. It might there fore 
fall to another form of organized force. 
 
Possible future actions. At the moment, both the leadership of the former RGF 
and political leaders in exile express the desire to return to Rwanda by force if 
necessary. They do not have the military strength to do so at the moment but appear 
willing to take the time to train and equip themselves over whatever time it may take. If 
the former RGF is removed to remote sites they may be tempted to are the 
opportunity to train. Their activities wilt he of great interest to the present Government 
in Rwanda. Since Zaire has an interest in seeing the refugee home as quickly as 
possible, they would not have the credibility to monitor the former RCF or the 
leadership in exile to ensure that they do not spend their time preparing an invasion of 
Rwanda. A credible neutral force under UN authority would be required to reassure the 
present Rwandan Government that A clandestine training programme was not 
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being conducted. Since UNAMIR is not credible in the eyes of the former RGF, some 
other UN force will need to be mandatai Monitoring former RGF. There are three sites 
that bave been proposed by the Zairian Government to receive the former RGF: 
lrebu, Lokandu and Kongolo. The logistical implications of each are considered 
elsewhere. Each one is isolated and would be relatively easy to guard once the 
troops of the former RGF have been moved in order m get them there, a guarded 
transport system will have to be set up. Since the means of transport will have to 
come from UN sources, UN troops could be used to carry out guard tasks. The 
Zairian authorities favour using all three camps to reduce the political tension that a 
large force in one place could pose. This would place approximately 10,000 former 
RGF soldiers and dependants in each site. If all throe sites are used; their a 
battalion-sized force would he required to each one to allow for rotation of troops and 
adequate rest in each case, the guards to escort former RGF troops to their 
destinations could be provided from the battalion tasked to guard the final site. It is 
anticipated that a company-sized force could handle each pipeline from start to finish 
if reliable transport is provided to keep troops moving through. 
 
Monitoring political leaders. several sites have been chosen to receive political 
leaders in exile. Mbandaka, the only site visited, does not have the capacity to 
accommodate all of the persons expected. Separating the leaders from each other in 
different towns would reduce the. possibility of them co-ordinating a military plot to 
invade Rwanda, however it would increase the security requirement.  in suggested 
that further investigation of suitable venues is required, as is clarification of the status 
of the guests. If they are to be removed from the Kivu area by force then they must 
be held in their new locations by force as well. This may require a for m of security by 
the host country. It must then be determined whether the guests are to be held 
incommunicado or not_ If they are, then nothing needs to be done to prepare. the 
sites. If they are not, then perhaps the best destination for them would he Kinshasa 
since that is the only site with good communications in the country. The actual 
number of troops required for guard duty cannot be determined until the final choice of 
accommodation sites has been made. If, however, several countries/ towns are to be 
chosen, then the host countries will be responsible for monitoring the activities of the 
guests adequately participation. it is known from comments made in the camps that 
the Hutu population of Rwanda does not trust some specific countries. Since both the 
host nation and the target population are French speaking, efforts must be made to 
find French-speaking troops to fulfil the guard and monitor duties discussed titre. A 
list of potential donor countries should he developed by UNHQ. 
 
7.6.4. Discussion of factors 
 
The political implications for the UN of forcibly separating the former RGF and 
political leaders from the refugee population in the Kivu area are staggering. Yet, if they 
are to be removed against their will then there Would appear to be a limited choice of 
methods: either deception or force. Deception can this level. given the nature and the 
number of agencies and forces involved, is not feasible. Therefore, farce will 
probably be necessary to remove the political leaders and former RGF members . 
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The actual removal could be done by a coalition force of some kind, but the 
monitoring and transport would require UN forces and therefore will implicate the IIN 
in whatever action will he taken. Given the levels of fear present in the camps at the 
moment and the sources of that fear, this venture is considered to be highly dubious. 
However, it could conceivably be carried out successfully if, and only if, decisive 
action is allowed. secrecy will be absolutely necessary before D-day. 
 
The deployment of a guard force and the issuing of a UN mandate could not 
be done in strict secrecy, therefore the exercise would be very messy and liable to 
generate significant casualties if resistance is encountered. Given the level of fear 
and the irrationality it seems to engender among Rwandese, resistance must be 
anticipated, and therefore a great deal of care must be exercised in undertaking this 
mission in order to avoid both casualties and controversy. 
 
The military options are limited to the selection of sites and the conduct of the 
initial removal. The site selection being a political matter, and since the Zairian 
authorities have ,'.ready selected these sites, construction of the camps and setting 
up the mandate of the UN force should begin as soon as the decision to go ahead 
has been taken. Given the poor communications and the state of the national 
infrastructure in the operational areas, it will probably take at least three months to 
complete preparations at the reception sites once a budget has been approved. 
Troops should be on the ground in the sites at least one week before guests arrive. 
The: total UN troop requirement for the guard sites assuming resistance is 
encountered is assessed as follows: 
 
a. Lokandu site. 1Battalion 
b. lrebu site:  1 Battalion 
c. Kongolo site:  1 Battalion 
d. VIP guards:  rovided by local authorities  
e. Existing camp sites in Kivu province at Mugunga, pansi and Katale will 
also require: I Battalion size/ location if political persuasion works, then the 
requirements can be reduced to one company in each location augmented by 
several UNMO detachments.  
 
Whichever deployment option we arc forced into, it will be necessary to establish a 
communications network to co-ordinate the execution of the plan. There is no 




It is recommended that the consequences of the action proposed here be 
given very careful consideration before it is adopted. It is the considered opinion of the 
Commission members that separating the political leadership and the former RGF 
from the refugee population in the Kivu are could be both hazardous to the future 
reputation of the UN and unlikely to lead to the desired immediate result The 
operational difficulties alone of forcibly separating and detaining the numbers of 
persons envisaged here snake this a very daunting task. if, however, it is decided to 
proceed with this operation, secrecy must be strict and immediate. 'The likelihood of 
a leak is very high given the need to Canvass natioas for contributions and the need 
for debate in the Security Council prior to establishing a mandate. It is recommended 
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that in camera discussions be held with potential donor nations before bringing the 
matter up for open debate.  
 
SECURITY IN THE CAMPS 
 
while contemplating the military plan set out below it maybe  necessary to 
consider simply putting an oycrwhelming multinational security 
force(complete commando brigade) in the existing camps to ensure low and 
order, and as a deterrent to the armed elements. Should the presence of 
this force achieve the desired result. The detail plan outlined below may 
not have to be implemented.  
 
It is recommended that other options, such as intensification of diplomatic 
pressures on the refugee leaders and the current Rwandan Government, be 
explored before committing a force to this action. However, since the 
commission was specifically created to formulate a plan for the separation and 
relocation, a proposed plan has been set below. 
 
8. OUTLINE PLAN 
 
8 1 General 
 
The joint UN/ Zairian Commission undertook a thorough reconnaissance 
of refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaire. The 
Commission also visited sites proposed by the Zairian Government in Kongolo 
(Shaba province), i ctkando (Marfiema province), and Irebu (Equator province). 
During all the visits, the Commission met and held discussions with Zairian 
Government and military authorities and representatives (if UNHCR ICRC. 
NGOc. refugee leader. and military leaders off the former Rwandese 
Government Forces (RG F At the end of the visits and discussions, it was 
Possible to arrive at various courses open to the C. . commission or option plans 
with Specific aims on the mission assigned to us. The various factors hearing on 
the. situation have been very carefully considered.Whatever plan is proposed 
hue also takes cognizance of the fact. that the current Rwandese Government 
positively and transparent ently pursues re conciliation with a guarantee of 
security and return of property to rightful owns while the trial of those accused 




THE AIM OF THE COMMISSION IS TO STUDY CAREFULLY THE RWANDESE 
REFUGEE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU PROVINCES or ZAIRE. 
WITH  THE VIEW TO IDENTIFYING POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE 
MEMBERS OF THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND 




8.3 Options one. 
 
A United Nations force operating under Chapter VII and under a different 
mandate from that of UNAMIR., 
 
a. Advantages The advantages of this option are 
i. it will have a mandate that will enable it to face any cventualities; 
ii.  A force under a UN hanner will be considered neutral and therefore 
acceptable. 
b. Disadvantages. The disadvantages are: 
i. Owing to its very nature, the UN force will take sometime to assemble and 
vital time will be lost 
ii. Owing to national directives, even though such a force Will operate 
under Chapter VII, there is bound to be hesitation when action has to be 
taken. 
iii. it is not certain whether the Zairian Government will accept Chapter VII in 
this operatiom. 
 
8.4. option two 
 
A multinational coalition force bed by a country with strong armed forces and 
credible resources 
 
a. Advantages. The advantages are. 
i. Speed in deployment; 
ii. Decisive in nature; 
iii. Total commitment. 
b. . The disadvantages of this option arc: 
i. If the operation should go wrong, the blame is borne only by that 
country that leads the coalition. 
ii. The difficulty in getting a nation to head such a force  
 
8.5 Conclusions on options 
 
The two options presented could achieve: the aim. However, option two is mast 
likely to achieve the desired goal with minimum delay in order to get the refugee problem 




The commission assessed option two as the one that has a greater degree of 







8. 7 Force level 
 
Judging from the threat analysis in the existing camps and the need to provide 
security at the new camp sites, a force level of a commando brigade grmp and an 
infantry brigade will be required to undertake the task. This is because of the terrain and 
the consequent separation of forces and also became of the need to have built-in 
reserves for rest and the rotation of troops It should be noted at this point that it is 
anticipated that both brigades could be quickly thinned out once the RGF had bean 
placed in cantonments. This force will have, in addition, Zairian socurity forces to 
undertake some Mice duties. The structure of such a force will be such that it has control 
over the existing and the new camp sites with emphasis nn security of the refugees 
 
 
8.8 Concept of Operation 
 
The Concept of the coalition force Will be that of deployment of commando units 
in the existing camps and the infantry units in the new sites, in such a manner as to 
isolate the RGF, political and militia éléments from the ordinary refugees and to ensure 




The main threat in the existing camps as stated in the analysis of the various 
groups is that of the militia and to some extent the militant elements of the RGF„ Also. 
the Presidential guard location is unclear, it is believed to be secretly located with the full 




Thé commando battalions should be organized into Battalion Headquarters and 
three commando task-organized companies which will sort out the RGF for relocation in 




military authority. The infantry battalions would be in charge of security at the new sites. 
 
8.11 Engineer Regiment 
 
This unit should he organized into Regimental Headquarters and its inherent 
construction, plant and technical squadrons, and should have sufficient resources to 
undertake a variety of reconstruction and utility tasks. This regiment must be capable 
within its own organization to undertake the following tasks: 
 
a. Repair and maintenance of existing air fields; 
b. Expansion of existing camp sites; 
c. Repairing and constructing hridges up to medium and heavy class,  
d. Repairing existing roads; 
e. Providing potable water to the force and the refugees, even though 
UNHCR may be in position to undertake this task; 
f_ Repairing existing buildings and construction of new ones; 
g. Efficient in river transportation and watermanship; and 
h. Explosive ordinance disposal in the existing refugee camps. 
 
8.12 Air transport squadron 
 
The transport squadron attached to the force must be military, with its own 
inherent capabilities of transport, air recce and air traffic control. The ground forces could 
provide air field security. Failing to get a typical air transport squadron, a civilian 
contractor maybe assigned, but this second option may result in inefficiency as 
experienced elsewkrc. It must be borne in mind that speed of execution is of the 
essence The air squadron will  undertake the following tasks: 
 
a. Transportation of the refugees: 
b. Resupply of troops and refugees; 
c. Air reconnaissance; 
d. Casualty evacuation; 
e_ Transportation of reserve or rapid reaction teams; and 
f Liaison between Zairian Government and other agencies 
 
8.13. Medical support unit 
 
The medical support unit should be of in expanded field medical company, with 
the capability of surgery and handling of tropical diseases. Among other health needs, 
the medical company wilt undertake the following: 
 
a. Co-ordination acro-medical evacuation; 
b. Supervision of sanitation in the camps; 
c. Minor and major surgecy to the troops and refugees; 
d. Medical support to-the local population;   
e. Ambulance service; and 
f. Put in place a 40-bed ward facility. 
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8.13.1 logistics battalion 
 
The logistics battalion will initially be organized with two companies deployed, one 
in the North and South Kivu area and the other one supporting the new sites,. Once the 
relocation is completed then the battalion will be reduced to one company. and 
eventually the company could be replaced by standing contracts. These companies 
must be equipped m carry out the following tasks: 
 
a. Overland transportation of re-supply items from airfields and river banks to 
the troops and refugees at the various camp sites; 
b. Stockpiling and distribution of ration, water, petrol oil and lubricants (POI.) 
and spare parts to unit locations; 
c. Transportation of refugees overland- and 
d. Repair and recovery - 2" and 3' line. 
 
8.13.2 Communication squadron 
 
There is virtually no existing telecommunication system in the areas where the 
new camps are to he sited. therefore there is need for the force in have its own inherent 
communication system to undertake the following' 
 
a. VHF and HF communication network within and outside the camps;  
b.  Facsimile; 
c. Telephone - INMARSAT and cellular; 
 d. Air despatch services; 
e. Postal services to troops and refugees; and 
f. Radio broadcast facility. 
 
8,13.3 Movement control unit 
 
Owing to the complex nature of the various types of transportation involved in the 
operation, there is need to have a movement control unit to co-ordinate it. There will be 
land, sea end air transportation. 
 
9. Logistical implications 
 
The deliberations of the Commission have provided two main options to be 
analysed logistically - either the relocation would he voluntary or involuntary. Both 
options would consist of moving 30,000 persons simultaneously to three new sites - 
Kongolo„ Lôkandu and Irebu - cach with a forecast of 10,000 persons. Other options can 
also be considered, using varying quantities of transportation resources. 
 
The following assumptions were made: 
 
a. The Kongolo airport would be improved to receivc C-130 aircraft after a 
technical assessment has been completed; 
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b. Communications would be inadc available at all sites (two airports of 
embarkation and three airports of disembarkation); 
c. Transition camps would be set up in Kindu and Mbandaka (48-hour 
transition camps) and in Coma and Bukavu (less than 12 hours); 
d. All military persons and their families in Bukavu would be moved to 
Kongolo, whereas those in Goma would be moved equally to Lokandu and 
Irebu; 
e. The political leaders with their families (1,200) would be moved to a site 
selected by the Zairian authorities in the western part of the country. 
Mbandaka is used for the purpose of this estimatc; 
f. AI; construction costs estimated by the Zairian engireer advisor are 
accurate within Zaire and consider complete refurbishment of all sites 
Howevet. UNHCR has a simplified method of refurbishing such camps. 
The total cost is still being assessed; 
g. All movements to Lokandu and Irebu would he by boats initially; and 
h. Zairian forces would ensure the security at the current camps in North and 
South Kivu, as well as. identifying and lathering the political leaders. the 
military forces and their families. 
 
and mariame for each of one site security a none with of a requacum in 
move the persons initially by road transport buses and trucks, from their 
current sites to the airports of embarkation (Apoe) and in the case of 
Kongolo from the airport of disembarkation (Apod) to the new site. The 
mode of transport from Apoe to Apod would be by C-1.30 whereas from 
the Apod in Kindu and Mbandaka to the new sites the mode of 
transportation would be by boat. The detailed requirements: and costs are 
attached as Tables 4 and 5; 
 
9.1 The logistics implic cations related to protection 
 
The cost related to the protection factor of this operation are attnchcd a.v Table 1. 
The logistics implications related to this factor include 
 
a.  The military forces required to be deployed in the North and South Kivu 
areas to perform the task of separating the political leaders and the military 
forces from the ordinary refugees will he Provided by a combined forge of 
a coalition-led force, sad will he supported logistically by the UN. These 
costs will include the deployment and sustainment costs of all military 
forces deployed ia these areas for these tasks. The sites that must be 
considered include at least the camps of Mugunga-(I  100), Pansi (4,000) 
and- Bulonge (6,000), and any other camps that may have ex-military 
personnel (up to 9,000), as weU as the locations in North and South Kivu 
of the political leaders (1,200), which must be confirmed; 
 
b. The military forces required during the movement phase of this operation 
to ensure the security of the Zairian population, the persons (political 
leaders and military) being moved, would be provided by multinational or 
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coalition-fed farces. These requirements must be considered under two 
different conditions whether the refugees being moved are doing so 
voluntarily (no protection requirement) or involuntarily (four companies at 
transition camps and regards on transportation modes); and 
 
e. The military forces required to provide the security at the relocation sites 
for both the refugees and the Zairian local population would be provided by 
multinational or coalition-led forces. These costs would include both the 
coot of deploying these solutions and their sustainment. Also. the living 
conditions, willingness of the refugees to be In these new camps. and the 
anticipated duration of the task could significantly affect the cost of this 
factor (î6 Military Observers if voluntary of four infantry battalions if 
involuntary). 
 
9.2 Movement implications 
 
The a mount of time required to move the political leaders and military personnel 
by air are attached as Tables 2 and 3. The costs related to axwing the selected persons 
to the new sites are attached as Tables 4 and S. The movement implications include: 
 
a. The actual mole of transportation will consist of a combinations of air, road. 
and maritime for each of the sites selected. There will be a reequirement to 
move the persons initially by road transport. buses and trucks. from their 
current sites to the airports of embarkation (Apoe) and in the case of 
Kongolo from the airport of disembarkation (Apod) to the new site. The 
mode of transport from Apoc to Apod would be by C-130 whereas from the 
Apod in Kindu and Mbandaka to the new sites the mode of transportation 
would he by boat. The detailed requirements and costs are attached as 
Tables 4 and i; 
 
b. the types and quantities of resources available; within Zaire such ac 
vehicles, boats or planes must be determined, as well as the rental / 
purchase casts The remainder of the required resources will have to he 
identified in accordance - with the specific limitations of cach site selected. 
The duration of these requirements for the movement and far the 
sustainment portion must be determined; and 
 
c. The costs related to preparing or improving the embarkation and 
disembarkation areas depend on the available mode of transport. 'The 
known requirements at this time are: 
 
i. Landing strips. (none of these has any aviation fuel available on 
site): 
(1) Goma - very good conditions; 
(2) Bukavu - can take a C-130 to be improved for larger aircraft . 
with no night facilities: 
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(3) Kongolo - CN-235 (max. 14 tons) laterite runway, with no 
tower, must be improved for larger aircraft; 
(4) Kindu - can take a C-130 and has a tower with landing lights; 
(5) Lokandu - no facility; 
(6) Buta - can take a C-130 but the runway is in bad condition 
(broken asphalt). 
(7) Mbandaka - can take a C-130 and has a tower with landing 
lights; and 
(8) Trebu - has an abandoned dirt runway covered by 
vegetation. 
 
ii. Roads Must roads in Zaire are very difficult. and the time required 
to cover the distances between the current refugee camps and the 
proposal sites range from a minimum of four days to a few weeks. 
The following road conditions must be considered for this operation: 
 
(1) Bukavu - roads are in had condition, particularly along Lake 
Kivu; 
(2) Kindu to Lokandu - 60 ken of mad repairs are required 
including 12 bridges; and 
(3) Mbandaka to Irebu - there is a road that covers the first 70 
km but there is no road for the last 62 km (100 km by the 
river). 
 
iii. Waterways. Travelling on water is a major mode of travel in ?sire, 
though very slow and limited for acce m during dry scasons and in 
the nurnbcr of people that can be moved simultaneously. The 
following proposed sites can only be reached by river from the 
nearest city that has an airport, at this time: 
   
(1) Lokandu to Kindu is 60 km; 
(2) Irebu to Mbandaka is 100 km.  
 
9.3 Site preparation 
 
The site preparation costs include the deploymem of the-UN/ multinational / 
coalition-led forces required to ensure the security of the sites as well as the build-up of 
the administrative requirements; the details of these costs are attached as Tables 6, 7, 8 
and 9. The two options are considered in the case of the site preparation: voluntary and 
involuntary. The site Preparation implications include: 
 
a. The costs related to renovating completely or simply doing basic repairs to 
the current infrastructures; 
b. The costs related to building new inf astructures; 
c. The time required to deploy both the security forces as well as the 
administrative resources; 
 37
d. The purchase / rental costs and the transportation costs of the plant 
equipment required to perform all the construction engineering tasks as 
there is none of this equipment available locally: 
e. The defensive stores requirements in die ease of an involuntary relocation; 
f. The acquisition and transportation costs of all the materiel required, as 
these is practically no materiel available locally; and 
g. The costs related to improve, repair and replace/build local facilities such 
as power and water plants, focal roads and other resources. 
 
9.4 Site sustainment 
 
The site sustaininent costs will vary depending on whether the relocation is voluntary 
(minimum security is required) or involuntary (where four infantry battalions must also be 
sustained); dose arc attached as Table 10. the site sustainment Implications include 
 
a. Which organization, depending on the status decided on, will have the 
responsiblity for sustaining the relocated political leaders, the military 
personnel and their families: 
 
b. The level) Of support expected to sustain the relocated elements and 
c. The actual Costs of sustaining the relocated elements. 
 
9.5 Financial implications 
 
The summary of the total costs estimated in accordanee with the two options 
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LIST OF PERSONS MET 
 
 
1 Acting Prime Minister of Zaire (27-09-94) 
2 Gomra UNHCR (initial meeting,) (29-09-94)  
3 UNHCR (second meeting) (30-09-94) 
4 Acting Govergor of North Kivu (30-09-94) 
5 Mugunga camp leaders (30-09-94) . 
6 Military leaders of the ex-RGF (30-09-94) 
7 Kbale camp leaders (01-10-94) 
8 Military leaders of the ex-RGF (01-10-94) 
9 Inera camp le aders (02-10-94) 
10 Vice-Governor of South Kivu (02-10-94) 
1l Bukavu/Uvira UNHCR (02-10-94) 
12 Prime Minister's Head of Mission (02-10-94) 
13 bukavu/Uvira NGOs (02-10-94) 
14 Pansi military cawp leadcrc (03-10-94) 
15 Rwinckse political leaders (03-10-94) 
16 ICRC rgmacntstiver (04-10-94) 
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The following attached tablcs summarize the logistical implications of this 
operation: 
 
I Protection logistics implications costs 
 
2 Airlift requirements with three x C-130 
 
3 Airlift requirements with six x C-30 
 
4 Transportation costs with three z C-130 
 
5 Transportation costs with six x C-130 
 
6 Sitc preparation costs - Kongolo 
 
7 Site preparation costs - Lokando 
 
8 Site preparation costs - Mbandaka 
 
9 Site preparation costs - Irebu 
 
10 Site substainment costs - all sites 
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SCHEDULE AND ITINERARY 
 
1. The mission was conducted during the period of 26 September to 13 October 
1994. The detailed itinerary was as follows: 
 
a. 26 September, 1800 to 2030 hrs - The first meeting conducted with all the 
members listed in paragraph 2 reviewed-and confirmed the terms of 
reference which would guide the mission for its tasks. These are attached 
as Appendix 1; 
 
b 27 September, 0900 to 1030 hrs - The members were received by Mr. 
Gustave Malumba Mbangula, Vice-Prime Minister. Minister of the Interior 
and Acting Prime Minister at the Ministry of the Interior. The points and 
resolutions discussed are attached as Appendix 2; 
 
c. 28 September - During this third day. various administrative details were 
completed prior to starting the visit. The sequence of activities for this day 
are listed at Appendix 3; 
 
d. 29 September - The Commission left Kinshasa [or Go= by UN aircraft. In 
Goma, the UN members of the team met with the Goma regional 
representatives from UNHCR and discussed a Possible itinerary for the 
next two days. The information obtained is at Appendix 4; 
 
e. 30 September - The fifth day of the Commission consisted of a series of 
visits and meetings. These were: 
 
i. 0830 hrs - UNHCR Information meeting on the current situation 
within the Rwandan refugee camps within the area of North Kivu 
(Appendix S); 
ii. 1100 firs - Meeting with the Acting Governor of North Kivu 
(Appendix 6); 
 
iii. 1430 hrs - Visit of the Mugunga camp and meeting with some of the 
camp leaders (Appendix 7); and 
 
iv. 1830 hrs - Meeting witi, military leaders of the ex-RGF (Appendix 8),  
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f. 1 October - 
 
i. The Commission members spent the meaning waiting to travel to 
the Kabale refugee camp. They left at 1200 hrs and met the Kabale 
camp representatives in an hotel in Kiwanja 10 kms north of Kabale 
between 1400 and 1800 hrs The details of this meeting are in 
Appendix 9;  
 
ii. A sub-commission meeting was held with the military leaders at 
1930 hrs, during which a List of the military components with their 
families for the North Kivu area was submitted (Appendix 10). 
 
g. 2 October - During this day the Commission travelled to Bukavu and held 
the following meetings / visits: 
 
i. Visit of the Inera refugee camp at 1020 hrs (Appendix 11); 
 
ü. Meeting with the Vice-Governor of South Kivu at 1200 hrs 
(Appendix 12); 
 
iii. Meeting with the UN 1 iCR Bukavu/ Uvira representatives at 1343 
hrs, during, which the Commission's Zairian milita y members went 
to meet the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 13) 
 
iv. Lunch at Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara's residence (1430 hrs), where the 
Commission members received 'inside' information obtained by the 
Commission's Zairian military members from the local Zairian 
military commander (Appendix 14). Brig Cien Anyidoho left the area 
for Kigali, Rwanda at 1530 his to submit an interim report to the 
SRSG UNAMIR; and 
 
v. Meeting with the Bukavu /Uvira NGO representatives at 1700 hrs 
(Appendix 15). 
 
h. 3 (October )- 
 
i. The Commission members travelled to the Pansi Rwandese military 
camp and met with the military leaders of the camp (Appendix 16). 
Mr. leddo Van Drunen left the Commission to return to Geneva; 
 
ü. The Commission held a meeting with the representatives of the 
Rwandcso political leaders in the Bukavu area at. 1700 hrs 
(Appendix 17) 
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i. 4 October - 
 
i. Some of the Commission members met with an ICRC 
representative at 1530 hrs to discuss the status of the Rwandese 
ex-military currently in Zaire (Appendix 18); 
 
ii. The Commission met with the South Kivu military leader. at 1B00 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
 
PROTECTION LOGISTICS IMPLICATION COSTS 
 
 













Current sites (North and South 
Kivu) 500 1,500 2,400 7,200 
Transport (North Kivu) 0 0 20 60 
Transport (.South Kivu) 0 . 0 20 60 
Transport (Air - Goma to Kindu) 0 0 4  
Transport (Air - Goma to 
Mbandaka) 0 Q   
Transport (Air - Bukavu to 
Kongolo)  0   
Transit site Goma 0 0 120 360 
Transit site (Bukavu) 0 0 120 360 
Transit site (Kindu) 0 0 120 360 
Transit Site (Mbandaka) 0 0 120 360 
Transport (road - Kindu) 0 0 10 30 
Transport road - Kindu to 
Lokandu) 0 0 20 60 
Transport (road - Mbandaka) 0 0 10 30 
Transport (boat - Mbandaka to 
Irebu) 0 0 20 60 
Transport (road - Kongolo) 0 0 10 30 
New sites (political leaders)   0 0 
 44
- 





New site (Irebu) 12 42 1200 3,600 
   800 2.400 
New site (Kongolo) 12 42 1200 3,600 
   800 _2,400 
Total costs/mornth 536 1,626 6,602 19,806 
Total costs/6 months . 536 9,756 6,602 118,836 
(first 6 months)     
Total costs/6 months 36 126 2,400 43,200 
(after first 6 months)     
 
1. $3.000.00 is the estimated cost of one military person not on - includes: monthly 
contribution paid to the country, deployment/ redeployment sustainment (food, 
water), other costs (fuel, spare pacts, R & R, medical, dental ...) 
 
2. It is estimated that those in receipt of MSA will cost monthly $3,500.00 (MSA + 
transport) 
 
3. The security elements included in the curent sites in North and South Kivu are 
estimated, for a period of less than six-month duration, at: 
 
a. three commando battalions at 600 personnel each; 
b. a communications and formation beadquarters of 150 personnel;  
 
c. two engineer troops -150 personnel; 
d. two support organizations including medical and logistics elements - 200 
personnel; 
e. two air elements - 150 personnel; and 
f. total - 2,450. ` 
 
4. In the cast of a voluntary movement. the military component would require 
approximately 500 personnel (headquarters, communications, engineers, medical, 
logistics and air functions). 
 
5. The security elements required for each new side include: 
 
a. an infantry battalion - 800 Persornnel for the duration including additional 
comminications, medical, logistics and air ekments; and 
b. an engineer squadron - 400 personnel for the initial construcfon period. 
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Table 2  
 
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWADAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
AIRLIFT REQUIEMENT (WITH THREE X C-130) 
 
ACTIVITIES BUKAVU to KONGOLO GOMA to KINDU 
GOMA to 
MBANDAKA 
Pens to move 10,000 10,000 11,200 
Req'd chalks 167 167 187 
Total chalks 210  235 
Loading time 1  1 
Flying time 1  3 
Unloading time 1  1 
Flying time 3  3 
Total time 6 4 8 
Chalks/day/ 
plane 2 3 1 
Days req'd 







35 (X 2 = 70) 
32 (X 3 = 96) 




I. 60 pax/plane with personnel belongings. 
2. 80 per cent availability of Aircraft flying time. 
3. Bukavu to Kongolo return flying time includes refuelling in Goma. 
4. Chalks/day is based on 12 hours daylight flying time. 
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Table 3  
 
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH SIX -130) 
 
ACTIVITIES BUKAVU to KONGOLO GOMA to KINDU 
(GOMA so 
MBANDAKA 
Pers to move _ 10,000 10,000 11,200 
Req'd chalks 167 167 187 
Total chalks 210 210 233 
Loading time 1 1 1 
Flying time 1 1 3 
Unloading time 1 I 1 
Flying time 3 1 3 
Total dime 6 4 8 
Chalks/day/ 
plane 2 3 1 
Days req'd 









total = 69 
days/ 10 weeks 
 
l. 60 pax/plane with personnel belongings. 
2. 80 per cent availability of aircraft flying time. 
3. Bukavu to Kongolo return flying dime includes refuelling in Goma. 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ( WITH TRHEE X C-130) 
 
SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT RESOURCES COSTS US $K 
Current sites (ZAP) 
 
  
Transport (North Kivu) 4 X bus 440 
 8 X truck  
T -ansport (South Kivu) 3 X bus  330 
 6 X trucks  
Tr ransport (Air - Goma to Kindu) - 334 1670 
1 X C-130 at 3 /day flying hrs  
Transport (Air - Goma. to Mbandaka) 1002 5010 
1 X C-130 at 1 chalk/day flying hrs  
Transport (Air - Bukavu to Kongolo) 500 2500 
1 X C-130 at 2 chalks/day flying hrs  
Transit site (Kiadu) t X bus 8o 
 1 X truck  
Transit site (Mbandaka) 1 X bus 80 
 1 X truck  
Transport (boat - K indu to Lokanda) 1 X boat 82.5 
at 18o persons/day for 55 days   
Transport (boat - Mbandaka to lrebu) at 60 1 X boat 230.3 
persons/day for 167 days   
Transport (road - Kongolo) 1 X bus 1 X truck SO 
TOTAL 10 x bus 10,523 
 17 X trucks  
 2 X boat's  
 1,836 FH  
1. Estimated costs. 1 X flying hour (FH)  = $5,000.00 
1 X bus (Purchase)  = $50,000.00 
1 X 3 T truck (') - = $30,000.00 
1 X boat (rental per day) = $1,500.00 
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Table 5 
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ( WITH SIX X C-130) 
 
SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT RESOURCES COSTS US $K 
Current sites (ZAP)   
Transport (North Kivu) 8 X bus 880 
 16 X trucks  
Transport (South Kivu) 6 X bus 660 
 12 x trucks  
Transport (Air - Goma to Kindu) - 334 1670 
2 X C-130 at 3 chalks/day/each flying hrs  
Transport (Air - Goma to Mbandaka) 1002 5010 
2 x C-130 at I chalk/day/each flying hrs  
Transport (Air - Bukavu t0 Kongolo) 500 2500 
2 X C-130 at 2 chalks/day/each flying hrs  
Transit site (Kindu) 2 X bus 160 
 2 X truck  
Transit site (Mbandaka) 2 X bus 160 
 2 X trick  
Transport (boat - Kindu Lo Lokandu) 1 X boat 82.5 
at 180 persons/day for 55 stays   
Transport (boat - Mbandaka Lo Irebu) at 60 1 X boat 250.5 
persons/day for 167 days   
Transport (road - Kongolo) 2 X buy, 2X trick 160 
Total 20 X bus 11,533 
 34 X trucks 
 2 X boats  
 1,836 FH  
1. Estimated costs'.  1 X flying hour (rat)  =$5,000.00 
1 X bus (purchase)  =$50.000.00 
1 X 3-T truck (*)  = $30,000-00 
1 X boat(rental per day) = $1,500.00 
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Tables 6 
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - KONGOLO 
 
ACTIVITIES VOLUNTARY US $K 
INVOLUNTARY 
US SK 
Time req'd to move 7 days 14 days 
Movement costs -   
Eqpt/Mat   
Acquisition costs   
Eqpt/Mat   
Building repair 4,149 4,149 
costs   
Acquisition cosh  300 
Defence stores   
Total 4,149 4,649 
 
1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through 
Kinshasa. for in-theatre briefing/preparation, to Kongolo. It also includes any 
preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved. 
 
2. Time req'd does not include the refurbishment/repair required to he done. 
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Table 7  
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 





US $K - 
INVOLUNTARY 
US $K 
Time req'd to move 7 days 14 days 
Movement costs -   
Eqpt/Mat   
Acquisition costs   
Eqpt/Mat   
Building repair '   
costs   
Acquisition cosec   
Defence stores   
Total 3,090 3,590 
 
1. Time req'd do move includes the travelling time from the home country through 
Kinshasa, for in-theatre bricfing/preparation, to Lokando. It also includes any 
preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved. 
 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 








Time req'd to move 7days 14 days 
Movement costs -   
Eqpt/Mat   
Acquisition costs   
Eqpt/Mat .  
Building repair 2,275 2,275. 
costs   
Acquisition costs  500 
Defence stores   
Total 2,275 2,775 
 
1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through 
Kinshasa, for in-theatre briefing/preparation. to Mbandaka. It also  includes any 
preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved 
 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - IREBU 
ACTIVITIES VOLUNTARY US $K 
INVOLUN'TARY 
US $K 
Time rcq'd to move 7 days 14 days 
Movement costs -   
Eqpt/Mat   
Acquisition costs   
Eqpt/Mat   
Building repair  2,275 
costs   
Acquisition cost  500 
Defence stores   
Total 2,275 2,775 
 
1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through 
Kinshasa, for in-theatre briefing/preparation, to Irebu It also includes any 
Preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved. 
 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
SITE PREPARATION COSTS – ALL SITES 
 
ACTIVITIES VOLUNTARY US $K 
INVOLUNTARY 
US $K 
Transportation   
costs - Kongolo   
T trnsportation   
costs - Lokando   
Transportation   
costs - Mbandaka   
Transportation   
costs - Ireba   
Refugees costs   
all sites   
Total costs   
 
1. The transportation costs includes the costs related to moving all supplies requited 
by the UN personnel. The acquisition costs arc included in the personnel sosts. 
 
2. The refugees costs include the transportation and acquisition costs of all goods 




JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
SUMMARY TABLE OF ALL COSTS 
 








(next 6-months 126 7,200 
Security 
(first 6-months) 9,756 118,836 
Security 
(next 6-months) 756 43,200 
Security/year 10,512 162,036 
Movement (3 X C-130) 10,523 10,523 
Site preparation - 
Kongolo 4,149 4,649 
Site preparation - 
Lokando 3,090 3,.590 
Site preparation - 
Mhandaka   
Site preparation - 
irebu 2,775 2,775 
Site sustain ment/ month   
Side sustainment/year   
Total fixed costs   
Total Costslmnoth   
Total costa/year   
 
l . The total flixed costs include the site preparation and the movement costs 
2 The variable costs include the costs of the forces involved with the protection and 
the sustainment costs. 
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Annex C  
 
 
JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION 
IN THE 
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE 
 
SCHEDULE AND ITINERARY 
 
1. The mission was conducted during the period of 26 September to 13 October 
1994. The detailed itinerary was as follows: 
 
a. 26 September, I800 to 2030 hrs - The first meeting conducted with all the 
members listed in paragraph 2 reviewed and confirmed the terms of 
rcfennce which would guide the mission for its tasks. These are attached 
as Appendix t; 
 
b. 27 September, 0900 to 1030 hrs - The members were received by Mr. 
Gustave Malumbu Mbangula, Vice-Prime Minister Minister of the Interior 
and Acting Prime Minister at the Ministry of the Interior. The points and 
resolutions discussed are attached as Appendix 2; 
 
c. 28 September - During this third day, various ad ministrative details were 
completed prior to starting the visit. the sequence of activities for this day 
are listed a Appendix 3; 
 
d. 29 September - The Commission left Kimsbasa for Corns by UN aircraft. In 
Goma, the UN member's of tho learn meet with the Goma regional 
representatives from UNHCR and-discussed a possible itinerary for the 
next two days. The information obtained is at Appendix 4; 
 
e. 30 September - the fifth clay of the Commission consisted of a series of 
visits and meetings. These were: 
 
i 0830 hrs - UNHCR lnformation meeting on the current situation 
within the Rwandan refugee camps within the area of North Kivu 
(Appendix S); 
ii. 1100 hrs - Meeting with the Acting Governor of North Kivu 
(Appendix 6); 
iii. 1430 hrs - Visit of the Mugunga camp and meeting with some of the 
camp leaders (Appendix 7)-. and 
iv. 1830 hrs - Meeting with military leaders of the ex-RGF (Appendix8).  
 
f 1 October - 
 
i. The Commission members spent the morning waiting to travel to the 
Kabale refugee camp. They tuft at 1200 hrs and met the Kabale 
camp representatives in an hotel in Kiwanja. 10 kins north of 
Kabbale between 1400 and 1800 hrs. The details of this meeting 
are in Appendix 9;  
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ii. A sub-commission meeting was held with the military leaders at 
1930 hrs, during which a list of the military components with their 
families for the North Kivu area was submitted (Appendix 10). 
 
g. 2 October - During this day the Commission travelled to Bukavu and held 
the following mectings/visits; 
 
i. Visit of the Inera refugee camp at 1020 hrs (Appendix II); 
 
ü. Meeting with the Vice-Governor of South Kivu at 1200 hrs 
(Appendix 12); 
 
iii. Mectiag with the UNHCR Bukavu/Uvira representatives at 1345 hrs 
during which the Commission's Zairian military members went to 
meet the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 13); 
 
iv. Lunch at Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara's residence (1430 hrs), where the 
Commission members received 'inside" information obtained by the 
Commission's Zairian military member from the local Zairian military 
commander (Appendix 14). Brig Gen Anyidoho left the area for 
Kigaii, Rwanda at 1530 hrs to submit an interim report to the SRSG 
UNAMIR; and 
 
v. Meeting with the Bukavu/ Uvira NGO representatives at 1700 hrs 
(Appendix 15). 
 
h. 3 October - 
 
i The Commission members traveled to the Pansi Rwandese military 
camp and met with the military leaders of the camp (Appendix 16). 
Mt. Jeddo Van Drunen left the Commission to return to Geneva; 
 
ii. the Comnission held a meeting with the representatives of the 
Rwandese political leaders in the Bukavu area at 1700 hrs 
(Appendix 17). 
 
i . 4 October - 
 
i. Some of the Commission members met with an ICRC 
representative at 1530 hrs to discuss the status of the Rwandese 
ex-military currently in Zaire (Appendix 18); 
 
ii. The Commission met with the South Kivu military leaders at 1800 
hrs (Appendix 19). 
 
2. The Commission members left Bukavu and started the next phase of the trip, 
which consisted of visits to different sites selected by the Zairian authorities for the 
relocation of Rwandese political leaders and military personnel: 
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a. 5 October - Meeting with local officials and visit of a Zairian military camp 
in Kongolo, Shaha region (departed Bukavu at 1015 hrs and arrived in 
Kongolo at 1330 hrs). Two additional  members joined the Commission in 
Bukavu: Mr. Collins Asare from UNHCR and Maj Phil Lancaster from 
UNAMIR 
 
b. 6 October - Meeting with local officials in Kindu. Maniema region (departed 
Kongolo at 1030 hrs and arrived in Kindu at-1130 hrs); 
 
c. 7 October - Travel to Lokandu by dugout and visit of a Zairian military 
camp (Departed Kindu at 1120 hrs and arrived in Lokandu at 1640 hrs); 
 
d. 8 October - Travel to Kindu by dugout (departed Lokandu at 1030 hrs and 
arrived in Kindu at 1940 hrs); 
 
e. 9 October - Travel to Kisanganl, Upper Zaire region (departed Kindu at 
0930 hrs and arrived in Kisangani at 1030 hrs). Unsuccessfully tried to 
have a meeting with the Vice-Governor and military commander of Upper 
Zaire; 
 
f. 10 October - Travel to Buta, Lower Uele sub-region and Mbandaka, 
Equator region (departed Kisangani at 08l 5 hrs, arrived in Buta at 0900 
hrs departed Buta at 1230 hrs and arrived in Mbandaka at 1445 hrs). In 
Buta, the Commission members met the local authorities and wexe told 
that there were no sites to visit near Buta. In Mbandaka the Commission 
members met the Vice-Governor and the military commander for the 
Equator region; and 
 
g. 11 October - Four members of the Commission travelled by spend boat to 
the lrebu military camp (depaned Mbandaka at 0830 hrs and returned at 
1515 hrs) while other members visited potential sites in Mbandaka for 
political leaders The Commission members left Mbandaka at 1700 hrs and 
arrived in Kinshasa at 1830 hrs. 
 
3. The activities of the commission in Kinshasa consisted of completing the final 
report: 
 
a. 12 October (1700 hrs) - Meeting of the Commission's UN representatives 
to discuss the methodology for competing the ffnat report; 
 
b. 13 october (0900 hrs) - Meeting of the Commission's UN representatives to 
review the proposed final report; 
 
c. 13 October (1400 hrs) - Meeting of the complete Commission to discuss 
the final report and 
 
d.  14 and 15 october were the work session to complete the final report 
 
